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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to introduce a synthetic ALM model that catches the main specificity
of life insurance contracts. First, it keeps track of both market and book values to apply the
regulatory profit sharing rule. Second, it introduces a determination of the crediting rate to
policyholders that is close to the practice and is a trade-off between the regulatory rate, a
competitor rate and the available profits. Third, it considers an investment in bonds that enables
to match a part of the cash outflow due to surrenders, while avoiding to store the trading history.
We use this model to evaluate the Solvency Capital Requirement (SCR) with the standard
formula, and show that the choice of the interest rate model is important to get a meaningful
model after the regulatory shocks on the interest rate. We discuss the different values of the
SCR modules first in a framework with moderate interest rates using the shocks of the present
legislation, and then we consider a low interest framework with the latest recommandation of
the EIOPA on the shocks. In both cases, we illustrate the importance of matching cash-flows
and its impact on the SCR.
Keywords: ALM model; Solvency capital requirement; Standard formula; Cash-flow match-
ing; Liquidity gap; Surrender risk; Book value; Profit sharing
1 Introduction
Life insurance contracts are very popular in the world and involve very large portfolios. In 2017,
the life insurer assets were about 7.5 trillions of euros in Europe (source: Insurance Europe) and 7.2
trillions of dollars in the United States (source: American Council of Life Insurers). To manage these
large portfolios on a long run, insurance companies perform what is called an Asset and Liability
Management (ALM). We refer to the recent paper [1] for an overview of the current topics and
issues of ALM. Basically, insurance companies invest the deposit of policyholders in different asset
classes (equity, sovereign bonds, corporate bonds, real estate, ...), while respecting a performance
warranty with a profit sharing mechanism for the policyholders. Thus, insurance companies have
to determine an appropriate allocation between the different types of asset. This allocation should
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be a good trade off between risk and returns, but also with the capital requirement imposed by the
regulator to handle the portfolio. To determine a suitable allocation strategy, it is worth to rely on
an ALM model that takes into account the main specifies of the life insurance business.
Many works in the literature have dealt with the fair valuation of insurance liabilities, see e.g.
Briys and de Varenne [9], Bacinello [2] or more recently Delong et al. [11]. However, when handling
large portfolios of life insurance liabilities over on a long run, the fair valuation of the contracts under
a risk neutral setting is not the only issue. The insurance company is also interested in investing
the policyholders deposit optimally, which has to be made under the real world probability, like in
the pioneering work of Merton [19]. Besides, the insurance company may also want to minimize
or at least impose an upper bound on the Solvency Capital Requirement (SCR) related to this
portfolio of liabilities. To address these questions, it is necessary to have a reliable ALM model
that describes properly the life insurance business. One important specificity of these models is to
keep track of both market and book values in order to determine the realized gains and losses that
enter in the profit sharing mechanism. Up to our knowledge, one of the first model of this kind
has been proposed by Gerstner et al. [14]. They consider an insurer that invests in bonds with a
buy and hold strategy on zero-coupon bonds with a fixed maturity. The insurer keeps a constant
allocation proportion in bonds, which leads sometimes to short sell bonds. The crediting rate to
policyholders is the same as the one proposed by Grosen and Jørgensen [15]: it is basically the
maximum of the guaranteed interest rate and the profit sharing rate. However, the book value is
approximated without neither taking into account the history of trading nor the difference between
buy and sell orders for updating of book values. Berdin and Grundl [3] fill this gap and calculate
the book values according to the German GAAP (General Accepted Accounting Principles). They
also consider the investment in different asset classes and across different bond maturities, which
is then more precisely described by Berdin et al. [4].
In this paper, we present a new ALM model that incorporates the main features of life insurance
business and handles both market and book values. For simplicity of exposition, we consider only
two asset classes: equity and riskless bonds, that we consider as a good approximation of top-rated
sovereign bonds. The first original feature of our model brings on the determination of the crediting
rate to policyholders. To determine this rate, we take into account the gains and losses made during
the reallocation and the corresponding profit sharing rate. We consider also a competitor rate that
model the rate given by competing insurance companies to their policyholders. Then, the insurance
company drive its latent gain and losses and the profit sharing reserve in order to reach the targeted
crediting rate, if it is possible. Otherwise, it tries to give the best rate possible while keeping a
part of the profit sharing reserve, but in any case the crediting rate is above the minimal regulatory
rate. Interestingly, the four cases that we distinguish to determine the crediting rate form a good
indicator to monitor the ALM business. A second original feature of our model is that it takes into
account dynamic surrenders (or lapses): their proportion is modeled as a function of the difference
between the crediting and the competitor rates. Such a dynamic surrender rate is also considered in
the model proposed by Floryszczak et al. [12]. The third original point of our model is to consider
an investment in an equally weighted portfolio of bonds with maturity going from 1 year to n years.
The dynamic of the coupon rates of the different bonds is also precisely described. A similar but
different idea is considered in [4]. The nominal value of the 1-year bonds enables essentially to
match the cash-flow of the surrenders. This is very important to hedge a part of the risk related
to interest rates. Our ALM model is written with the French GAAP, but it could quite easily be
adapted to other local GAAP.
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Our original motivation to design such an ALM model is to evaluate the Solvency Capital Ratio
(SCR) by using the Solvency II standard formula, which is part of the regulation of the European
Union [10]. Other papers have recently dealt with the standard formula: Gatzert and Martin [13]
compare the standard formula with internal models that basically use a Value-at-Risk of the basic
own funds with a level of 99.5%, Boonen [5] compares the Value-at-Risk and the Expected shortfall
risk measures by looking at the stress factor in the standard formula that would calibrate these
measures. In our numerical experiments, we evaluate the different SCR modules in our model with
a constant allocation between bonds and stocks. We first examine a case with moderate interest
rates around 2% and then case with low interest rates where we use the latest recommendation of
EIOPA [17] for the shocks. We interpret the different cases corresponding to the shocks on equity
and bonds. Interestingly, we find that interest rate models like Hull and White model that mean
reverts toward a parametric curve are not really well suited for the standard formula. They are able
to fit the shocks but then the calibrated curve oscillates too much and the model is meaningless.
Our numerical study also points some weaknesses of the standard formula. Last, we illustrate the
importance of matching cash-flows in ALM, and discuss how to do it optimally in our model for
minimizing the SCR requirement with the standard formula.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduce the main notation, presents the ALM
model and the mechanism that determine the crediting rate to policyholders. This part is self-
contained and does not rely on the model of the different assets, that is presented in Section 3. We
discuss in particular the choice of the interest rate model in view of the application of the standard
formula. Last, Section 4 presents and discusses the different numerical simulations.
2 The ALM model
We consider an insurance company that has sold life insurance contracts to many policyholders.
To be precise, we consider here General Account (GA) guaranteed with profit contracts. We do
not consider Unit-Link (UL) type of contracts where policyholders bear the risk due to market
variations, which is clearly simpler for insurance company to handle. GA contracts are mainly
described by two drivers: the minimal guaranteed rate rG that triggers the minimal earnings, and
the participation rate pipr ∈ [0, 1] that forces the insurer to redistribute this proportion of gain on
equity assets. The French legislation imposes that pipr ≥ 0.85 (see [6] p. 5). Policyholders do not
receive intermediary payments: they are paid only when they exit the life insurance contract.
The insurance company then has to choose a strategic asset allocation that will enable to face
up to the liabilities and provide some earnings. In particular, it is interested to assess the Solvency
Capital Requirement (SCR) needed to run its strategic asset allocation. Typically, the insurance
company invests in different asset classes such as equity, sovereign bonds, corporate bonds, real
estate. Here, we will for simplicity consider two type of assets: equity and riskless bonds, the latter
being a good approximation of top-rated sovereign bonds. We consider a time horizon T ∈ N∗,
usually greater than thirty years in practice. We will assume that the insurance company only make
reallocations at times t ∈ N∩ [0, T ) in order to reach a portfolio with respective weights wst ∈ [0, 1]
and wbt = 1 − wst in equity and bonds. The portfolio is assumed to be static on (t, t + 1), and at
time T , the portfolio is liquidated. The time unit can be in practice one year or one semester: in
this paper, we take a one year unit for our numerical investigations.
We denote by (St)t≥0 the equity asset that can be thought as a stock market index to reflect
that the insurance company invests in many different stocks. Concerning interest rate products, we
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assume that there exist riskless zero-coupon bonds and bonds of any maturity that can be bought
at par. Following the notation of Brigo and Mercurio [8], we denote by P (t, t′) with t ≤ t′ the
price of a zero-coupon bond at time t with maturity t′. For simplicity, we assume that the different
bonds pay coupon at the same frequency as the portfolio reallocation: thus at time t ∈ N, the value
of a bond with maturity t+ n, constant coupon c and a unit nominal value is given by
B(t, n, c) =
n∑
i=1
cP (t, t+ i) + P (t, t+ n), (2.1)
and the swap rate given by
cswap(t, n) =
1− P (t, t+ n)∑n
i=1 P (t, t+ i)
(2.2)
is the value of the coupon leading to a unit value of the bond. For t ∈ N, n ∈ N∗ and ct :=
(cit)i∈{1,...,n}, we consider a portfolio containing for any i, 1/n bond with maturity t+ i and coupon
cit. We denote
B¯(t, n, ct) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
B(t, i, cit) (2.3)
the value of this combination of bonds at time t.
Before to model the mechanism of the ALM management, we also have to specify at which rate
policyholders enter or exit. Since our purpose is to evaluate the Solvency Capital Requirement, we
will only consider (as recommended in Solvency II) the case where policyholder contracts run off
and exclude the arrival of new contracts, even though it could be obviously added to the model.
We assume that the proportion of policyholders that exit on the period (t, t+ 1) for t ∈ N is given
by pet ∈ (0, 1), and that policyholders exit uniformly on (t, t + 1). This corresponds to the case of
infinitely many policyholders that exit at a continuous rate λet = − log(1− pet ) on (t, t+ 1). So, our
model assume that there is a large number of policyholders that exit independently, conditionally
on the information they have at time t. We will assume that
∀t ∈ N, pet ≥ p > 0. (2.4)
Thus, p quantifies the structural surrenders while pet −p is the proportion of surrenders that evolves
along the time (typically the dynamic surrenders and the mortality variations), that will be modeled
afterwards in Section 3.
2.1 Main variables and portfolio initialization at time t = 0
The liability of the firm is divided into different reserves that must comply with the local accounting
standards. Even if the main principles of the Solvency II directive are followed by most of the
countries, there are some specific features from one country to another. In our model, we will take
into account the French regulation rules, and we refer to [6] for a recent study of the French legal
prudential reserve.
The Mathematical Reserve, denoted by the process (MRt)t∈{0,...,T}, is the main reserve in life
insurance. It corresponds to the insurer’s debt towards its policyholders. For sake of simplicity, we
assume that the initial premium MR0 is paid once and for all (single premium) by policyholders
without fees. Thus, the initial value MR0 of this reserve is given by the initial deposit of the
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policyholders. At the end of each year, the mathematical reserve is reevaluated by annual benefits
(the crediting rate) paid by the insurer to the insured party.
The Capitalization Reserve, denoted by the process (CRt)t∈{0,...,T}, is imposed by the French
legislation to buffer the capital gains obtained when selling bonds. The purpose of this reserve is
twofold. First, it dissuades insurance companies from using interest rate movements to make profits
on bonds, since it may impact negatively its policyholders on the long-run (typically, capital gains
on bonds result in lower coupons). Second, it acts as a cushion against interest rate movements as
the fund stored in the reserve can be used later on in order to absorb capital losses coming from
selling bonds. The capitalization reserve is a part of the equity capital of the insurance company.
Last, the Profit-Sharing reserve denoted by the process (PSRt)t∈{0,...,T} is a legal provision used
as a capital buffer against stock movements in order to smooth the crediting rate. A fraction of
the capital gains obtained from selling equity are stored in this reserve and is distributed the next
years. This reserve belongs to the policyholders: the French legislation imposes a maximum of 8
years to redistribute the accumulated profit to policyholders.
The capital gain of the insurance company is determined by the difference between the book
value (i.e. the purchase price) and the market value of the sold assets. Thus, we denote respectively
by BV st , BV bt and BVt = BV st + BV bt the book values of the equity assets, the bonds and of the
whole portfolio at time t. We similarly denote MV st , MV bt and MVt = MV st +MV bt the respective
market values. It is clear how to evaluate market values, and we will explain later on how book
values are calculated in our model.
All these quantities MRt, CRt, PSRt, BV st , BV bt , MV bt and MV st remain nonnegative for all
t ∈ {0, . . . , T} in our ALM model.
At inception (t = 0), the insurance company receives all the policyholders deposit MR0 and
invests this amount in a reference portfolio according to target proportions ws0 in stocks and wb0 in
bonds. We furthermore make the following hypothesis: the company has no existing back book of
contracts sold in the past. Thus, there are no capitalization and profit-sharing reserves, and book
values and market values coincides:
CR0 = PSR0 = 0, BV b0 = MV b0 = wb0MR0 and BV s0 = MV s0 = ws0MR0.
However, it would be easy at this stage to consider existing back book of contracts by initializing
accordingly these values. We now specify the quantity of assets in each class. Let us note that
during all the time, the quantities hold by the insurer are nonnegative. The initial holding φs0 in
the stock asset is clearly given by
φs0 =
ws0MR0
S0
.
Concerning the bonds, we assume that all bonds at bought at par during the whole strategy. We
assume that the amount wb0MR0 is invested in an asset which is an equally weighted basket (with
weights 1/n) of riskless coupon bearing bonds from maturity 1 to n with unitary face value. We
thus set
ci0 = cswap(0, i), i = 1, . . . , n.
From the definition of the swap rate, we have B¯(0, n, c0) = 1, with c0 = (ci0)i∈{1,...,n} and B¯ defined
by (2.3). Thus, the quantity of asset is simply given by
φb0 =
wb0MR0
B¯(0, n, c0)
= wb0MR0.
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Here, we stress that we consider the investment in a basket of bonds with different maturities instead
of only one bond. Thus, the insurance company is able to match a part of the cash outflows: the
nominal value of the one-year bond is mainly used to pay back the policyholders that exit during
the first year. This cash-flow matching is commonly used to hedge against interest-rate risk and
is known as a so-called immunization technique. In order to hedge the minimal rate of surrenders
p, a natural choice is to take n =
⌈
1
p
⌉
. If one wants to take into accounts the additional market
surrenders pet − p, it can be relevant to take more generally n ≤
⌈
1
p
⌉
, n being roughly speaking
an average of 1/pet . The choice of n and the influence of this parameter will be discussed in the
numerical section.
2.2 Reallocation, claim payment and margin at time t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1}
This subsection presents the different steps of the portfolio reallocation at time t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1}.
In particular, it describes the composition of cash-inflows and outflows, the legal profit-sharing
mechanism, a way to determine the crediting rate for policyholders and the accounting margin for
shareholders. The goal of the reallocation is to end with an asset side that is allocated according
to the weights wst in equity and wbt in an equally weighted portfolio of bonds with weights 1/n as
described in (2.3). This amounts to have the quantities
φst =
wstMVt
St
and φbt =
wbtMVt
B¯(t, n, ct)
at the end of the the reallocation procedure, where MVt is the market value of the assets and
ct = (cit)i∈{1,...,n} are coupon values that will be precised afterwards. Concerning book values, since
the capitalization reserve is managed with a separate accounting, the goal is to have at the end
of the reallocation: BVt = MRt + PSRt, i.e. that the liabilities exactly match the portfolio book
value. The corresponding balance sheet is given in Table 1. For all balance sheets, the sum of the
asset book values is equal to the sum of the liabilities.
Assets Liabilities
BV st MRt
BV bt PSRt
Table 1: Book value balance sheet after the reallocation at time t.
We present the whole reallocation procedure in five steps. For convenience, we set t1 = t2 =
. . . = t5 = t the different steps of the ALM management procedure at time t, the step i+ 1 being
immediately executed after the step i. Some quantities are updated only once during the five steps,
and we use then the index t for these quantities. Other quantities, such as the book value are
updated at different steps, and we note BVti the book value after step i and BVt the book value
after the last update in the whole procedure. Note that these quantities (except market values) are
then kept constant on (t, t+ 1) until the next reallocation.
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2.2.1 Step 1: cash inflows
We recall that we assume that portfolio is static on (t − 1, t) and therefore the quantity of equity
(resp. bond) assets at the beginning of the reallocation is φst−1 (resp. φbt−1). More precisely, for all
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the insurance company holds φbt−1/n bonds with maturity t−1 + i and coupon cit−1.
The financial income corresponding to the coupon payments from each bond is thus given by
FIt = φbt−1
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
cit−1
)
. (2.5)
Besides, the nominal value coming from matured bond is given by φ
b
t−1
n . Thus, the insurer’s overall
cash inflow CIF is obtained by aggregating terms:
CIFt = FIt +
φbt−1
n
(2.6)
The book value in bond assets has to be updated. Following standard accounting procedures, the
nominal value of the matured bonds have to be removed from the book value. We thus set
BV bt1 = BV
b
t−1 −
φbt−1
n
In order to satisfy the bookkeeping condition, the insurer must redistribute the income FIt on the
liability side. Table 2 sums up the insurer balance-sheet after step 1.
Assets Liabilities
BV st−1 MRt−1
BV bt1 PSRt−1
CIFt FIt
Table 2: Book value balance sheet after step 1.
2.2.2 Step 2: claim payment
Cash outflows occur when policyholders exit their contract. We recall that the proportion of
policyholders that exit on (t− 1, t) is given by pet−1. We assume that these policyholders are paid
with the minimum guaranteed rate rG, pro rata the time elapsed between t− 1 and the exit. Since
we we assume that they exit uniformly on (t− 1, t), this amounts to the cash outflow
COFt = pet−1MRt−1
(
1 + r
G
2
)
(2.7)
On the liability side, the liabilities corresponding to remaining policyholders is then given by
MRt2 = (1− pet−1)MRt−1
On the asset side, the difference between cash inflows CIFt and cash outflows COFt is called the
liquidity gap Gt:
Gt = CIFt − COFt = CIFt − pet−1MRt−1 −
rG
2 p
e
t−1MRt−1
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A positive gap Gt > 0 means that assets inflows are sufficient to cover claims. A negative gap
Gt < 0 means that additional liquidity is necessary to pay claim-holders. To fill the funding
gap, the insurer must sale assets in this situation. Table 3 depicts the insurer balance after claim
payment. We thus set
Assets Liabilities
BV st−1 MRt2
BV bt1 PSRt−1
Gt FIt − rG2 pet−1MRt−1
Table 3: Book value balance sheet after step 2.
F˜ It = FIt − r
G
2 p
e
t−1MRt−1, (2.8)
that represents the coupon income corrected with the part of these earnings that are distributed
to the surrendering policyholders.
2.2.3 Step 3: reallocation
We assume that the insurer follows a static investment strategy on (t, t+1) and allocates its capital
according to the portfolio weights wst between stocks and bonds wbt at time t. The available capital,
which is also the market value of the portfolio MVt, is given by the sum of the liquidity gap Gt
and the market value of each asset classes:
MVt = Gt + φst−1St +
φbt−1
n
n−1∑
i=1
B(t, t+ i, ci+1t−1), (2.9)
where the function B is defined by (2.1). The term φst−1St is the market value of the equity
and φbt−1
(
1
n
∑n−1
i=1 B(t, t+ i, ci+1t−1)
)
is the market-value of the bonds that have not reached ma-
turity. Note that before the reallocation, the bond portfolio is made with bonds with maturity
i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1} and coupon ci+1t−1.
In what follows, we assume that MVt > 0 and calculate the new quantities invested in each
asset-classes and derive the procedure to update the book values of each asset class. The case
MVt ≤ 0 is very unlikely but may theoretically happen, for example if the surrendering proportion
pet−1 is high, the stock value has strongly decreased (St/St−1 << 1) and interest rates have strongly
increased on (t − 1, t). In this case we assume that the shareholders of the insurance company
directly pay back COFt to the surrenders and that the portfolio is reallocated according to the
target weights with a self-financing strategy, so that its market value remains positive. The book
values are modified accordingly and the crediting rate is then rG. Since the case MVt ≤ 0 never
happens in usual conditions and in our simulations, we do not give more detail.
We first consider the equity, where the target is to achieve a proportion wst of the market value
MVt. This leads to a new position in stock given by:
φst3 =
wstMVt
St
> 0
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We note ∆φst = φst3 − φst−1 the variation of the number of equity assets hold by the insurer. If
∆φst ≥ 0 (buy order), the book value in equity is increased by the quantity of stocks that was
purchased at the market-value St:
BV st3 = BV
s
t−1 + ∆φstSt
If ∆φst < 0, the insurer sells the quantity −∆φst of equity assets. In accounting, a standard inventory
valuation method used by practitioners is the First In First Out (FIFO) method where the oldest
goods purchased are sold in priority. The realized Capital Gain or Loss (CGL) is then calculated
accordingly. However, This procedure requires to record the entire history of all purchases and is
computationally demanding. Here, we consider the following approximation
BV st3 = BV
s
t−1
(
1 + ∆φ
s
t
φst−1
)
=
φst3
φst−1
BV st−1,
which amounts to say that all the equity asset units hold in the portfolio have the same book value.
The proportional reduction factor ∆φ
s
t
φst−1
∈]−1, 0] represents the proportion of sold stock. The capital
gain or loss made by the sale is then given by CGLst = −∆φst (St −BV st−1/φst−1).
Let us recall that for x ∈ R, x+ = max(x, 0) and x− = max(−x, 0). We sum up the equity book
value and the capital gain or loss (regardless of it is a sale or a purchase):
BV st3 = BV
s
t−1 + (∆φst )+ St −
(∆φst )−
φst−1
BV st−1 (2.10)
CGLst = (∆φst )−
(
St − BV
s
t−1
φst−1
)
. (2.11)
We now focus on the reallocation in bonds and recall that we assume that the insurer only buys
bonds at par. Before the reallocation, the bond portfolio is made with bonds with time to maturity
going from 1 to n−1. In order to continue the strategy of matching the cash flows coming from the
structural surrenders, the insurer needs to invest in a basket of bonds with longest time to maturity
equal to n. Thus, the insurer always has to buy the bond with longest time to maturity n. Let us
introduce the following reference market value
M̂V
b
t = φbt−1
(
1
n
n−1∑
i=1
B(t, t+ i, ci+1t−1) +
1
n
B(t, t+ n, cswap(t, n))
)
. (2.12)
This is the market value of the bond portfolio, if the insurer would buy exactly the same quantity
φbt−1/n of bonds with time to maturity n. If wbtMVt = M̂V
b
t , the insurer thus only buys φbt−1/n
bonds with time to maturity n to reach the target allocation. If wbtMVt > M̂V
b
t , he has to buy
more bonds and if wbtMVt < M̂V
b
t he has to sell some bonds. In what follows, we describe how to
do it, while keeping an equally weighted basket of bonds with time to maturity going from 1 to n.
Purchase of bonds (wbtMVt ≥ M̂V
b
t)
In this case, the insurer needs to buy more bonds to satisfy the target wbt . We note c
swap
t =
(cswap(t, i))∈{1,...,n} and have B¯(t, n, cswapt ) = 1 from (2.3). We then define
δbt = wbtMVt − M̂V
b
t ≥ 0, (2.13)
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so that wbtMVt = M̂V
b
t + δbt B¯(t, n, c
swap
t ). The insurer will then
• buy δbn at par bonds for each time to maturity i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1} with coupon ciswap(t),
• buy δ
b+φbt−1
n at par bonds with time to maturity n and coupon cnswap(t).
Let us recall now that holding α > 0 bonds with coupon c and α′ ≥ 0 bonds with coupon c′ and
the same payment schedule is equivalent to hold α+α′ bonds with coupon αc+α′cα+α′ . Therefore, after
the bond reallocation, the insurance company holds for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, (δb + φbt−1)/n bonds
with time to maturity i and coupon
cit = 1i≤n−1
φbt−1c
i+1
t−1 + δbciswap(t)
φbt−1 + δb
+ 1i=ncnswap(t). (2.14)
We can therefore write the market value of the bond portfolio as
MV bt = φbt3B¯(t, n, ct), with φ
b
t3 = δ
b + φbt−1, (2.15)
and in particular we have φbt3 ≥ φbt−1.
We now have to update the book value of bonds. Since there are only purchases, the book value
of the bought bonds is their market value. We thus set
BV bt3 = BV
b
t1 +
δb
n
n−1∑
i=1
B(t, t+ i, ciswap(t)) +
δb + φbt−1
n
B(t, t+ n, cnswap(t))
= BV bt1 + δ
b + φ
b
t−1
n
.
Sale of bonds (wbtMVt < M̂V
b
t)
When wbtMVt < M̂V
b
t , the insurer still has to buy bonds with time to maturity n, but he has to
sell the other bonds to get an equally weighted bond portfolio. Thus, he has to find a position such
that
wbtMVt = φbt3
(
1
n
n−1∑
i=1
B(t, t+ i, ci+1t−1) +
1
n
B(t, t+ n, cnswap(t))
)
.
Note that we necessarily have φbt3 < φ
b
t−1, since the right-hand side corresponds to M̂V
b
t for φbt3 =
φbt−1. This gives
φbt3 =
wbtMVt
1
n
∑n−1
i=1 B(t, t+ i, ci+1t−1) + 1nB(t, t+ n, cnswap(t))
> 0,
and the market value of the bond portfolio can be written as
MV bt = φbt3B¯(t, n, ct), with c
i
t = 1i≤n−1ci+1t−1 + 1i=ncnswap(t) for i = 1, . . . , n.
Let ∆φbt = φbt3 − φbt−1 < 0. The insurer has thus to buy
φbt3
n at par bonds with time to maturity n
and to sell, for each time to maturity i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}, ∆φbtn bonds with coupon ci+1t−1.
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We now have to update the book values. We use the same approximation method as for the
equity to evaluate the book value of the sold bonds. We thus set
BV bt3 = BV
b
t1
(
1 + ∆φ
b
t
φbt−1
)
+
φbt3
n
B(t, t+ n, cnswap(t)) = BV bt1
(
1 + ∆φ
b
t
φbt−1
)
+
φbt3
n
,
and the capital gain or loss on bond products is then given by
CGLbt = −∆φbt
(
1
n
n−1∑
i=1
B(t, t+ i, ci+1t−1)−
BV bt1
φbt−1
)
In the two following formulas, we sum up the book value update and the capital gain and loss
on bonds in both selling and buying cases
BV bt3 = BV
b
t1
(
1− (∆φ
b
t)−
φbt−1
)
+ n− 1
n
(∆φbt)+ +
φbt3
n
, (2.16)
CGLbt = (∆φbt)−
(
1
n
n−1∑
i=1
B(t, t+ i, ci+1t−1)−
BV bt1
φbt−1
)
, (2.17)
since ∆φbt = δb and φbt3 = φ
b
t−1 + δb in the buying case.
The capital gain or loss on equity CGLst is directly taken into account for the profit sharing
mechanism. Instead, the capital gain and loss on bonds CGLbt is handled separately in the French
legislation and supply the capitalization reserve. Precisely, the capitalization reserve at time t is
defined by
CRt =
(
CRt−1 + CGLbt
)+
. (2.18)
If CRt−1+CGLbt < 0, this quantity reduces the insurer return of the period. Since the capitalization
reserve is managed with a separate accounting, only
∆CRt = CRt − CRt−1 (2.19)
appears in the balance sheet at step 3, see Table 4.
Assets Liabilities
BV st3 MRt2
BV bt3 PSRt−1
CGLst ∆CRt
CGLbt
Gt F˜ It + CGLst −
(
CRt−1 + CGLbt
)−
Table 4: Book value balance sheet after step 3.
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2.2.4 Step 4: determination of the crediting rate
In order to determine the policyholder’s earning rate rph(t) on the period (t − 1, t), we propose a
management decision that follows the regulatory constraints and is a reasonable trade-off between
policyholders and shareholders interests. Most of the existing ALM model use a crediting rate that
has been proposed by Grosen and Jørgensen [15] which is the minimal regulatory rate. Here, we
propose a more sophisticated model for the crediting rate that we believe closer to the practice.
It involves a competitor rate and a control of the Latent Gain or Loss (LGP) and Profit Sharing
Reserve.
The existence of LGL, sometimes also called hidden reserve, results from the difference between
market and book values. Formally they can be realized by selling and buying instantly the same
amount of assets, but in practice this is just an account entry. It is a variable that the insurer can
use as a control to determine the crediting rate for policyholders. In what follows we consider only
LGL for stock assets since CGL on bond are constrained by the capitalization reserve and cannot
be redistributed to policyholders nor shareholders. Let MV st = wstMVt the current market value
of equity assets. The range of latent gain or loss can be described by the following interval
[−(MV st −BV st3)−, (MV st −BV st3)+].
There is a latent gain if MV st > BV st3 , and a latent loss if MV
s
t < BV
s
t3 . We define the latent gain
or loss function by
LGLst (α) = − (1− α) (MV st −BV st3)− + α(MV st −BV st3)+ α ∈ [0, 1] (2.20)
This function determines the amount of hidden reserve to distribute. Let us note that LGLst (α) is
non-decreasing with respect to α. The control α ∈ [0, 1] models the fraction of LGL to register on
the balance-sheet. The choice α = 1 amounts to take all the gain or zero loss. The control α = 0
takes all the loss or zero gain.
Remark 2.1. We have CGLstLGLst (α) ≥ 0, i.e. CGLst and LGLst (α) have the same sign. If
∆φst ≥ 0, this is true since CGLst = 0. If ∆φst < 0, one has to notice that we have
BV st−1
φst−1
=
BV st3
φst3
from (2.10). Therefore St − BV
s
t−1
φst−1
is equal to St − BV
s
t3
φst3
= (MV st − BV st3)/φst3, and these quantity
have the same sign.
Another control for the insurer is the proportion ρ ∈ (0, 1] of profit sharing reserve to distribute.
For simplicity, we will assume here that
ρ ∈ {ρ¯, 1},
where ρ¯ ∈ (0, 1] is fixed. The insurer has then two possible choices: to use all the profit sharing
reserve (ρ = 1) or to use only a part of it. Let us note that in our model, taking ρ¯ = 1 amounts to
have no profit sharing reserve.
Remark 2.2. Since (1/2)8 ≈ 0.004, we take in our experiments ρ¯ = 1/2 to be in line with the
French legislation that requires to redistribute all the profit within 8 years. This is also the choice
made by Berdin and Grundl [3] (see equation (22) therein) who work under the German rule.
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Due to the participation rate, the minimal crediting rate depends on α and ρ. In case of latent
gain (MV st ≥ BV st3), we note
TDt(α, ρ) = F˜ It −
(
RCt−1 + CGLbt
)−
+ ρ (PSRt−1 + CGLst + LGLst (α))) (2.21)
the amount that has to be redistributed to policyholders according to the participation rate pipr.
The first term corresponds to the coupon payment (2.8). The second term is the loss on the bonds
that exceeds the capital reserve. The third term corresponds to the aggregated gains on equity and
is nonnegative by Remark 2.1.
In case of latent loss (MV st ≥ BV st3), we define
TDt(α, ρ) = F˜ It −
(
RCt−1 + CGLbt
)−
+ ρPSRt−1 + CGLst + LGLst (α) (2.22)
the amount to be redistributed with the participation rate. From Remark 2.1, CGLst and LGLst (α)
are nonpositive. Contrary to the gains, the insurer does not smooth the losses with a factor ρ.
We now sum up the amount to distribute (2.21) by the following formula that covers both
capital gain or loss cases:
TDt(α, ρ) = F˜ It −
(
RCt−1 + CGLbt
)−
+ ρ (PSRt−1 + CGLst + LGLst (α)) (2.23)
− (1− ρ) (CGLst + LGLst (α))− .
We have the following straightforward but important property.
Lemma 2.3. The function (α, ρ) ∈ [0, 1]2 7→ TDt(α, ρ) is continuous and nondecreasing with
respect to α and ρ. It is constant with respect to α if St = BV st−1/φst−1, otherwise it is increasing
and affine with respect to α.
We are now able to define the minimal distribution of returns that the insurance has to give to
the (remaining) policyholders. The minimum guaranteed amount RGt (α, ρ) is defined by
RGt (α, ρ) = max
{
RGt , piprTDt(α, ρ)
}
, with RGt = rG(MRt2 + PSRt−1) (2.24)
Note that the part of the profit sharing reserve has to be credited exactly as the mathematical
reserve, since this reserve belongs to policyholders. Here, RGt is the minimum regulatory amount
corresponding to the minimum rate rG. Note that in practice, the minimum regulatory rate is the
maximum of rG and of 60% of a technical rate called “taux moyen des emprunts d’Etat” that is an
average of French sovereign bond rates, see for example paragraph A.6.2 of [4]. Here, we assume
for simplicity that rG remains above this technical rate.
Beyond the minimum rate, the insurance company wants to credit at least the same rate than
the other insurance companies in order to keep its policyholders. In fact, the surrender proportion
pet on (t, t+1) usually depends on the difference between the crediting rate and the one of the other
insurers. Thus, we assume that rcompt is a competitor rate. Typical choices can be
rcompt = rt or r
comp
t = max(rt, ηrph(t− 1)) with η ∈ (0, 1), (2.25)
where rph(t− 1) is the crediting rate of the past period and rt is the short interest rate. We define
the target crediting amount by
Rσt (α, ρ) = max
{
RGt (α, ρ);R
comp
t
}
, with Rcompt = r
comp
t (MRt2 + PSRt−1). (2.26)
13
This is the amount that the insurance company try to distribute if possible, which we discuss now.
We now determine αt, ρt and the amount Rpht to be credited to policyholders. By Lemma 2.3,
we know that we are in one of the following four distinct cases, going from the more to the less
favorable case for the insurer and the policyholder.
Case A: piprTDt(0, ρ¯) ≥ max
{
RGt ;R
comp
t
}
.
This means that the target amount can be credited to policyholders without dissolving unre-
alized gains if any or by realizing all the latent losses. The insurer decides then to take
αt = 0, ρt = ρ¯,
and credit the target amount Rpht = Rσt (αt, ρt) = piprTDt(αt, ρt) to policyholders.
Case B: piprTDt(1, ρ¯) ≥ max
{
RGt ;R
comp
t
}
and piprTDt(0, ρ¯) < max
{
RGt ;R
comp
t
}
.
This means that the target amount can be credited to policyholders, but the insurer has to
realize some latent gain or cannot realize all the latent loss. We assume that the insurer
decides to realize as less (resp. much) as possible latent gains (resp. losses). Note that by
Lemma 2.3, the function α 7→ TDt(α, ρ¯) cannot be constant in Case B, and the insurer has
to find the value α such that piprTDt(α, ρ¯) = max
{
RGt ;R
comp
t
}
. Lemma 2.3 gives that the
function is affine with respect to α, and therefore
αt =
1
pipr
max
{
RG;Rcomp
}
− TDt(0, ρ¯)
TDt(1, ρ¯)− TDt(0, ρ¯) .
The insurer also takes ρt = ρ¯ and credits then Rpht = Rσt (αt, ρt) = piprTDt(αt, ρt) to policy-
holders.
Case C: RGt ≤ piprTDt(1, ρ¯) < max
{
RGt ;R
comp
t
}
The target amount cannot be reached with the available latent resources, but the minimal
guaranteed rate can be reached. We assume then that the insurer makes its best effort on
the latent gains or losses by taking
αt = 1 and ρt = ρ¯.
The amount Rpht = piprTDt(1, ρ¯) is thus credited to policyholders.
Case D: piprTDt(1, ρ¯) < RGt .
In this case, the insurance company uses the whole profit sharing reserve and takes ρt = 1.
It also takes αt = 1 and credits then Rpht = max(piprTDt(1, 1), RGt ) to the policyholders.
Thus, in all cases, the minimum guaranteed amount RGt (αt, ρt) is given to policyholders. We define
then the crediting rate and update the mathematical and profit sharing reserves as follows:
rph(t) =
Rpht
MRt2 + PSRt−1
, (2.27)
MRt = MRt2 (1 + rph(t)) , (2.28)
PSRt = PSRt−1rph(t) + (1− ρ)
(
PSRt−1 + (CGLst + LGLst (α))+
)
. (2.29)
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The profit sharing reserve at time t is thus obtained as the proportion 1 − ρ of the realized gains
and of the updated profit sharing reserve. We also update the book value of stock assets to take
into account the realized gain or loss:
BV st4 = BV
s
t3 + LGL(αt).
The shareholder’s margin comprises a percentage 1−pipr on the amount to be distributed TDt(αt, ρt)
minus its contribution to bail out the company when the minimal amount cannot be met:
AMt = (1− pipr)TDt(αt, ρt)− (RGt (αt, ρt)− piprTDt(αt, ρt))+. (2.30)
Note that this contribution is only needed in Case D when RGt > piprTDt(1, 1).
Table 5 details the composition of the Book value Balance sheet after the crediting operation. As
Assets Liabilities
MRt
BV st4 PSRt
BV bt3 ∆CRt
AMt
Table 5: Book value balance sheet after step 4.
mentioned previously, the capitalization reserve is managed separately from other technical reserves.
While the mathematical provision and the profit sharing reserve are linked to the performance of the
portfolio, regulatory constraints require to invest the capitalization reserve in sovereign bonds Here,
we assume that it is invested in a one period zero-coupon bond. Since the capitalization reserve
belongs to the equity capital of the insurance company, the interests coming from the capitalization
reserve are given to shareholders. Their cash flow is then the sum of the accounting margin AMt
and the yield of the capitalization reserve:
P&Lt = AMt + CRt−1
( 1
P (t− 1, t) − 1
)
. (2.31)
2.2.5 Step 5: externalization of the shareholders’ margin and of the capitalization
reserve from the accounting
The margin AMt that determines the accounting return on capital invested by shareholders on
(t− 1, t) must be removed from the balance-sheet. The same has to be done for the capitalization
reserve movement ∆CRt, since the capitalization reserve is handled separately. One has then to
clear the amount AMt + ∆CRt from the balance-sheet. If this amount were externalized in cash,
one would have to calculate the capital gains made on it: the gain on equity assets should then
to be distributed to policyholders with the participation rate pipr and the gain on bonds should
modify the capitalization reserve. Thus, one would have to repeat the previous steps indefinitely.
To avoid this difficulty, we assume if AMt +CRt > 0 that a fraction of the assets corresponding to
the accounting value AMt + CRt is removed. This amounts to fund the shareholders’ margin and
the capitalization reserve with a fraction of the portfolio instead of cash. If AMt + CRt < 0, we
simply buy the quantity of assets and bonds with weights wst and wbt that corresponds to this book
value.
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This procedure leads to the following update of the stock book value
BV st = BV st4
(
1− (AMt + CRt)
+
BVt4
)
+ wst (AMt + CRt)−,
where BVt4 = BV st4 + BV
b
t3 since the bond book value is unchanged at step 4. The corresponding
position is
φst = φst3
(
1− (AMt + CRt)
+
BVt4
)
+ w
s
t (AMt + CRt)−
St
We do the same for the bonds and have
BV bt = BV bt3
(
1− (AMt + CRt)
+
BVt4
)
+ wbt (AMt + CRt)−
with the corresponding position
φbt = φbt4
(
1− (AMt + CRt)
+
BV Gt4
)
+ w
b
t (AMt + CRt)−
B¯(t, n, ct)
.
Note that for simplicity, we assume here that we can buy (when AMt + CRt < 0) bonds with
time to maturity i and coupon cit. It would have been possible to buy bonds at par, but this would
require then to modify again the coupon rates accordingly, similarly as in step 3. Table 1 represents
the balance-sheet at the end of step 5 and thus at the and of the whole reallocation procedure.
2.3 Closing of the strategy at time T
We now describe how the ALM portfolio is closed at time T . The insurance company starts with
the implementation of Step 1 described in paragraph 2.2.1. Things change then since the insurer
has to liquidate the portfolio. Since the insurer closes its portfolio, we consider the policyholders
that exit on (T − 1, T ) and the others that exits at time T in the same way. All the assets are
sold and all the capital gains or losses are realized, and the profit sharing reserve is released. The
capital gain or loss realized when liquidating the stock portfolio is given by:
CGLsT = φsT−1
(
ST −
BV sT−1
φsT−1
)
.
We now focus on the equally weighted basket of bonds. Keeping in mind that the bond with
shortest time to maturity has come due, the bond portfolio comprises bonds from maturity 1 to
n− 1, and the capital gain or loss is therefore given by:
CGLbT = φbT−1
(
1
n
n−1∑
i=1
B(T, T + i, ci+1T−1)
)
−
(
BV bT−1 −
φbT−1
n
)
.
This quantity impacts the capitalization reserve level as follows
CRT = (CRT−1 + CGLbT )+.
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The terminal bonus declaration is rather simple. The insurer must liquidate the profit sharing
reserve since it belongs to its policyholders and comply with the minimum guaranteed rate of
return rG. Let us define
TDT = FIT − (CRT−1 + CGLbT )− + PSRT−1 + CGLsT , (2.32)
the amount to distribute to policyholders. The credited amount to policyholders is:
RGT = max
{
piprTDT , r
G(MRT−1 + PSRT−1)
}
. (2.33)
Note that we do not consider for the final date a competitor rate since all the contracts terminate.
We then define the crediting rate rph(T ) =
RGT
MRT−1+PSRT−1 , the mathematical reserve MRT =
MRT−1(1+rph(T )) and PSRT = rph(T )PSRT−1, exactly as in equations (2.27), (2.28) and (2.29).
We define then the final accounting margin of the shareholders by
AMT = (1− pipr)TDT − (RGT − piprTDT )+.
Since the capitalization reserve RCT is a part of the equity of the insurance company, it is given
to shareholders. The terminal shareholders P&L is then:
P&LT = AMT + CRT−1
( 1
B(T − 1, T ) − 1
)
+ CRT (2.34)
At the maturity of the contract, the mathematical and profit sharing reserves MRT must be payed
to policyholders. The terminal cash outflow is thus
COFT = MRT + PSRT . (2.35)
2.4 Overall performance of the ALM
To assess the solvency situation, Solvency II regulation requires to value assets and liabilities on
a market consistent basis. It prescribes to use the Best Estimates Liabilities and the Basic Own-
Funds (also called Net Asset Value) to value the liability of the company. We explicit these key
quantities in our framework.
The Basic Own-Funds (BOF) corresponds to the market-consistent valuation of the equity
capital of the firm. It is determined as the present-value of future shareholders P&L cash flows
under the pricing measure Q. If we consider a short interest rate model (rt, t ≥ 0), the BOF is
given as follows:
BOF0 = EQ
[
T∑
t=1
e−
´ t
0 rsds(P&Lt)
]
. (2.36)
More generally, if (Ft, t ≥ 0) is the filtration representing the market information, we can define
the Basic Own-Funds at time t ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1} as BOFt = EQ
[∑T
u=t+1 e
− ´ ut rsds(P&Lu)
∣∣∣∣Ft].
The Best Estimates Liability (BEL) represents the total debt of the insurer. It corresponds to
the discounted sum (present-value) of future surrender cash outflows and terminal liability payment
BEL0 = EQ
[
T∑
t=1
e−
´ t
0 rsdsCOFt
]
. (2.37)
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We more generally define BELt = EQ
[∑T
u=t+1 e
− ´ ut rsdsCOFu
∣∣∣∣Ft] for t ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1}.
Since we are considering a pool of policyholders running off, all these cash flows are generated
from the initial Mathematical Reserve. We therefore get the so-called "no-leakage" condition:
MR0 = BOF0 +BEL0.
More generally, we have
∀t ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1}, MRt + PSRt + CRt = BOFt +BELt.
2.5 Solvency Capital Requirement of the ALM with the standard formula
To determine the Solvency Capital Requirement (SCR), the supervision authority provides a stan-
dard formula that consists in various stress tests for different type of risks. The risks are divided
between modules and sub-modules and combined into a global SCR for market risk according to an
aggregation formula. The detailed description of the SCR calculation can be found in the note writ-
ten by the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA), Section 2 of [16].
Short descriptions of the standard formula can be found in the appendix of [7] or in Subsection 3.2
of [5]. In our model, we only have to consider the equity and interest rate modules and we briefly
explain the standard formula in our framework.
2.5.1 Equity module
The SCR for equity risk SCReq is determined by the variation of the Basic Own-Funds BOF0 after
a negative shock on the equity asset class that occurs immediately after time 0, i.e. after the first
asset allocation. The negative shock seq ∈ (−1, 0) assumes that the value of stock assets decreases
with a certain percentage. The shock prescribed by the EIOPA may differ according to the type
of equity, see [16] p. 140 and Section 3 of [13]. Here, we recall that S should be seen as a weighted
average of stocks (like indices) in which the insurance company invests. Thus, we assume that
Sshock0+ = S0 (1 + seq) ,
where seq is the corresponding average of the shocks prescribed by the EIOPA.We noteBOF eq_shock0
the Basic Own-Funds calculated with this shock. The SCR for equity risk is then defined by:
SCReq = (BOF eq_shock0 −BOF0)− = (BOF0 −BOF eq_shock0 )+ (2.38)
2.5.2 Interest rate module
To estimate the solvency capital for the risk on interest rates, the EIOPA provides upward and
downward shocks to the initial term-structure. As for the equity, the shocks are assumed to
occur immediately after the first allocation at time 0. Let us suppose that we observe at time 0
market prices of zero-coupon bonds t 7→ Pmkt(0, t) and we note Rmkt(0, t) = −1t log(Pmkt(0, t)) the
corresponding yield curve. The shifted yield curves are then given by:
Rup/down(0, t) = (1 + sup/downt )Rmkt(0, t) (2.39)
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where supt (resp. sdownt ) is the upward (resp. downward) shock to the yield with maturity t. These
coefficients have been recommended in p. 137 of [16] and implemented by the European Commission
in the Articles 166 and 167 of the Delegated Regulation [10]1. They are summarized in the Table 6
below.
t 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
supt 70% 70% 64% 59% 55% 52% 49% 47% 44% 42%
sdownt −75% −65% -56% -50% -46% -42% 39% -36% -33% -31%
t 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
supt 39% 37% 35% 34% 33% 31% 30% 29% 27% 26%
sdownt −30% −29% -28% -27% -28% -28% -28% -28% -29% -29%
Table 6: Stress-Factors of the standard formula given by the EIOPA [16] in December 2012
For years t ≥ 90, the regulator prescribes the shocks supt = 0.2 and sdownt = −0.2. Between
ta = 20 and tb = 90 years, a the linear interpolation method has to be used to get the shocks:
∀t ∈ [ta, tb], sup/downt = sup/downta + (s
up/down
tb
− sup/downta )
t− ta
tb − ta . (2.40)
The SCR for up and down shock are determined by the variation of the basic own-funds if
the stressed yield-curve is used instead of the initial term-structure. Namely, we set SCRup =
(BOF0 −BOF up0 )+ and SCRdown = (BOF0−BOF down0 )+. The SCR for the risk on interest rates
is defined as the worst one of the two shocks:
SCRint = max(SCRup, SCRdown). (2.41)
Remark 2.4. Let us note fmkt(0, t) = − log
(
Pmkt(0,t+1)
Pmkt(0,t)
)
= (t + 1)Rmkt(0, t + 1) − tRmkt(0, t),
that can be seen as a forward rate on (t, t+1). Let (st)t∈N∗ be prescribed (deterministic) shocks and
Rshock(0, t) = Rmkt(0, t)(1 + st). Let fshock(0, t) = (t+ 1)Rshock(0, t+ 1)− tRshock(0, t) the stressed
forward rate. We then have
fshock(0, t)− fmkt(0, t) = (t+ 1)st+1Rmkt(0, t+ 1)− tstRmkt(0, t).
For large maturity t, it is likely to have Rmkt(0, t+ 1) ≈ Rmkt(0, t), which gives
fshock(0, t)− fmkt(0, t) ≈ st+1Rmkt(0, t+ 1) + t(st+1 − st)Rmkt(0, t).
Due to the multiplication by t, even small variations of the stress factor (and also of st+1−st) may
lead to important variations of the shocked forward rate. For example, if we assume for simplicity
Rmkt(0, t) = r for all t, the downward shock of Table 6 gives fdown(0, 13) = r− 27100r+ 13100r = 86100r
and fdown(0, 14) = 58100r, leading to an important variation of the downward shocked forward rate
between maturities 13 and 14. The same is observed with fdown(0, 18) = r − 28100r + 18100r = 90100r
and fdown(0, 19) = 71100r.
1Besides, a minimal increase (resp. decrease) of 1% is assumed for Rup(0, t) (resp. Rdown(0, t)), see also Boonen [5],
p. 411.
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This methodology has been set up when the interest rates were around 2% or 3%, but is no
longer relevant for very low or even negative interest rates. If we suppose for simplicity that
Rmkt(0, t) = 0, then the multiplicative stress rule (2.39) leaves rates unchanged and therefore leads
to a null SCR. Also, for negative rates, the formula (2.39) inverts the sign of the stress: the upward
stress factor leads to a decrease of the interest rate and conversely. To bypass this issue, the EIOPA
has recently recommended in 2018 [17] to add an additive factor, i.e. to replace (2.39) by
Rup/down(0, t) = (1 + sup/downt )Rmkt(0, t) + b
up/down
t . (2.42)
Between ta = 20 and tb = 90 years, the interpolation formula (2.40) is kept for st. An analogous
formula is used for bup/downt :
∀t ∈ [ta, t˜b], bup/downt = bup/downta + (b
up/down
t˜b
− bup/downta )
t− ta
t˜b − ta
,
with ta = 20, t˜b = 60 years and bup/downt = 0 for t ≥ t˜b.
t 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
supt 61% 53% 49% 46% 45% 41% 37% 34% 32% 30%
sdownt -58% -51% -44% -40% -40% -38% -37% -38% -39% -40%
bupt 2.14% 1.86% 1.72% 1.61% 1.58% 1.44% 1.30% 1.19% 1.12% 1.05%
bdownt -1.16% -0.99% -0.83% -0.74% -0.71% -0.67% -0.63% -0.62% -0.61% -0.61%
t 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
supt 30% 30% 30% 29% 28% 28% 27% 26% 26% 25%
sdownt -41% -42% -43% -44% -45% -47% -48% -49% -49% -50%
bupt 1.05% 1.05% 1.05% 1.02% 0.98% 0.98% 0.95% 0.91% 0.91% 0.88%
bdownt -0.60% -0.60% -0.59% -0.58% -0.57% -0.56% -0.55% -0.54% -0.52% -0.50%
Table 7: Stress-Factors of the standard formula given by the EIOPA [17] in February 2018.
2.5.3 Aggregation Formula
The SCR for market-risk is a combination between the equity and interest-rate risk in our frame-
work. It is defined as follows (see Articles 164 and 165 of [10]):
SCRmkt =
√
SCR2eq + SCR2int + 2εSCReqSCRint (2.43)
where the “correlation factor” ε = 0 if the interest-rate exposure is due to the upward-shock and
ε = 12 if it is due to the downward shock.
3 Asset Model
The insurance company invests policyholders deposits between two asset classes: riskless bonds
and stocks. Therefore, we have to model the equity asset St and the interest rates, for which
we choose a short rate model (rt, t ≥ 0). We denote (Ω,F ,Q) a risk neutral probability space
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and (Ft, t ≥ 0) the filtration that represents market information. Let (Wt, Zt)t≥0 be a standard
two-dimensional Brownian motion under Q and we set Zγt = γWt +
√
1− γ2Zt for γ ∈ [−1, 1].
Since we will mainly focus in this paper on the SCR valuation with the standard formula that has
to be made under a risk-neutral measure, we will not model the asset dynamics under the real
world probability. However, modeling for both risk-neutral and real world probabilities is relevant
for ALM to determine, for example, an optimal asset allocation under SCR constraints. This is
however beyond the scope of the paper.
Before specifying the equity and interest rate dynamics, we first describe the surrender rate
model for policyholders. We consider that the surrender rate is the sum of a component p ∈ (0, 1)
quantifying structural surrenders and a market contingent surrender rate DSR(∆t), where ∆t =
rph(t)− rcompt is the spread between the crediting rate to policyholders rph(t) defined in (2.27) and
the competitor rate rcompt defined by (2.25). The function DSR is defined as follows
DSR(∆) =

DSRmax for ∆ < α,
DSRmax
β −∆
β − α for α ≤ ∆ ≤ β, (3.1)
0 for ∆ > β,
where DSRmax ∈ (0, 1− p) is the maximum surrender rate, α the massive surrender threshold and
β the triggering surrender threshold. Therefore, surrenders occur with a proportion pet also called
exit rate:
pet = p+DSR(∆t). (3.2)
We assume that the equity asset follows a Black-Scholes model:
St = S0 exp
(ˆ t
0
rsds+ σSWt − σ
2
S
2 t
)
,
where σS > 0 is the volatility. Concerning interest rates, we consider a priori two different models:
the shifted Vasicek model (called Vasicek++ later on, see Brigo and Mercurio [8] paragraph 3.2.1
and Section 3.8) and the Hull and White model (see e.g. [8] Section 3.3). The Vasicek++ model
assumes that
rt = xt + ϕ(t), (3.3)
xt = x0 +
ˆ t
0
k(θ − xs)ds+ σrZγt ,
for some parameters x0, θ ∈ R, k, σr > 0, and ϕ : R+ → R. The Hull and White model assumes
that
rt = r0 +
ˆ t
0
k(ϑ(s)− rs)ds+ σrZγt , (3.4)
with parameters r0 ∈ R, k, σr > 0, and ϑ : R+ → R. Both models have very similar properties:
these are Gaussian models with explicit zero-coupon bond prices and closed formula for caplets,
and we refer to [8] for further details. In fact, as noticed by Brigo and Mercurio ([8], p. 101) the
two models are identical if we take
ϑ(t) = θ + ϕ(t) + 1
k
ϕ′(t). (3.5)
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Let us note however that the Vasicek++ parametrization offers a slightly larger class of dynamics:
for any piecewise continuous function ϑ, we can find a piecewise C1 function ϕ such that (3.5)
holds. Instead, there is no ϑ satisfying (3.5) when ϕ is piecewise continuous and not differentiable.
We just recall the zero-coupon bond prices at time t with maturity T ≥ t in the Vasicek++ model:
P V++(rt, t, T ) = A(T − t) exp
(
−
ˆ T
t
ϕ(s)ds− (rt − ϕ(t))gk(T − t)− θ(T − t− gk(T − t))
)
,
gk(t) =
1− e−kt
k
, A(t) = exp
(
σ2r
2k2 gk(t)−
σ2r
4kg
2
k(t)
)
and in the Hull and White model:
PHW (rt, t, T ) = A(T − t) exp
(
−rtgk(T − t)−
ˆ T
t
(1− e−k(T−s))ϑ(s)ds
)
.
The methodology to calibrate these models to market data (as required by the regulation, see
e.g. [22] p.8) is the same. For each parameters (x0, θ, k, σr) (resp. (r0, k, σr)), there exists a unique
deterministic function ϕ (resp. ϑ) that perfectly fits the zero-coupon bond prices Pmkt(0, t) ob-
served on the market (or deduced from market data). Therefore, one tries to find the parameters
that better fit the market data on options such as caplet or swaption prices, and then pick the
corresponding function ϕ or ϑ. These models comply with the Solvency II regulation that imposes
to fit the initial term-structure of interest-rate and to approximate well options market prices. To
perform the perfect fit of the the zero-coupon bond prices, one typically assumes some parametriza-
tion of the functions ϕ and ϑ. A typical choice is to assume these functions to be piecewise constant
or piecewise linear. Once parameterizations are chosen for ϕ and ϑ, the Vasicek++ and Hull and
White model may no longer be the same: the Vasicek++ model with piecewise constant ϕ is not
a Hull and White model with piecewise constant ϑ, and conversely. In what follows, we argue that
the parametrization of the Vasicek++ model is much more convenient to deal with the standard
formula.
To implement the standard formula described in paragraph 2.5.2, one has to re-calibrate the
models to the stressed zero-coupon curve. Since the stressed factors given in Tables 6 and 7 are
given on an annual basis, it is rather natural to consider piecewise constant shapes for ϕ(t) and
ϑ(t):
ϕ(t) =
∞∑
i=0
ϕi1t∈[i,i+1[, ϑ(t) =
∞∑
i=0
ϑi1t∈[i,i+1[.
We note ϕmkt (resp. ϑmkt) the function calibrated in the Vasicek++ (resp. Hull and White) model
to Pmkt(0, t) and ϕshock (resp. ϑshock) the function calibrated to exp
(
−t[(1 + st)Rmkt(0, t) + bt]
)
.
We keep the parameters (x0, θ, k, σr) constant (i.e. as before the shock) for the Vasicek++ model.
For the Hull and White model, we take (1 + s1)r0 + b1 as the initial short rate value after the shock
and keep the parameters (k, σr) constant: this is to reduce the fluctuations that we already observe
on ϑshock in Figure 1. From the zero-coupon bond price formulas, we easily get:
exp
(
−t[stRmkt(0, t) + bt]
)
= exp
(ˆ t
0
ϕmkt(s)− ϕshock(s)ds
)
= exp
(
−(s1r0 + b1)gk(t) +
ˆ t
0
(1− e−k(t−s))(ϑmkt(s)− ϑshock(s))ds
)
.
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Figure 1: Calibrated piecewise constant functions t 7→ ϕshock(t) (left) and t 7→ ϑshock(t) (right)
after the upward and downward shocks specified in Table 6 with no additive shock (i.e. bt = 0),
r0 = 0.02 and k = 0.2.
Figure 1 illustrates the calibrated functions. We have considered the case where the zero-
coupon bond prices Pmkt(0, t) are given by a Vasicek model with r0 = θ = 0.02, k = 0.2 and
σ = 0.01. We assume rcompt = rt and constant allocation targets wbt = 0.95 and wst = 0.05. The
first striking point is the oscillations of ϑshock, making the Hull and White model poorly realistic
after the shock. Instead, the variations of ϕshock are much more reasonable. We still observe some
unlikely moves between years 10 and years 20: as explained in Remark 2.4, this is due to small
variations of the stress factors that are amplified by the maturity. Thus, the Vasicek++ model has
much more meaning after the shock than the Hull and White model. We have plotted in Figure 2
the crediting rate to policyholders, as well as the empirical distribution of the cases A, B, C and
D described in Step 4 that determines the crediting rate to policyholders. We observe significant
oscillations of the mean crediting rate for the Hull andWhite model, that are explained by important
oscillations between the proportions of case A and case C. In contrast, the mean crediting rate and
the distribution of the cases A, B, C and D is much more regular in the Vasicek++ model. We
have also done the same analysis for the downward shocks: oscillations again appears in the Hull
and White model, but they are less marked because of the minimum guaranteed rate.
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Figure 2: Simulations after the upward shock on interest rates described in Table 6. Left: mean of
the crediting rate rph(t) defined in (2.27) with the 95% confidence interval. Middle (resp. Right):
proportions of the cases A, B, C and D in the Vasicek++ (resp. Hull and White) model.
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We now focus on SCRint defined by (2.41). Figure 3 shows the value of the SCR in function
of k when the central model is a Vasicek model with r0 = θ = 0.02, σ = 0.01 and k. We observe
almost the same value for SCRdown between Vasicek++ model and the Hull and White model, but
there is a significant difference for SCRup in favor of the Vasicek++ model, which impacts then
SCRint when the upward shock has a greater contribution than the downward shock.
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Figure 3: SCR values with Vasicek++ and Hull and White models in function of k for SCRdown
(left), SCRup (middle) and SCRint (right).
Last, we have plotted in Figure 4 the functions ϕshock and ϑshock after the upward and downward
shocks with the new recommendations of the EIOPA given in Table 7. Here, the zero-coupon bond
prices Pmkt(0, t) are given by a Vasicek model with r0 = θ = 0.005, k = 0.2 and σ = 0.01. We
observe even more oscillations with the Hull and White models, which makes this model irrelevant
after the shocks. Surprisingly, for the Vasicek++ model, we notice that the shifted functions cross
after 30 years: ϕup (resp. ϕdown) becomes negative (resp. positive). Thus, the upward (resp.
downward) shock on the risk-free interest rates leads to a downward (resp. upward) shock on the
spot rate after approximately year 35, which is a puzzling. This behavior is mostly due to the
phasing out of the additive term that is less innocuous as one may think. In the simplest constant
rate model, we observe that stopping the phasing out of b at time 60 has a significant effect.
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Figure 4: Calibrated piecewise constant functions t 7→ ϕshock(t) (left) and t 7→ ϑshock(t) (middle)
after the upward and downward shocks specified in Table 7. Right: calibrated piecewise constant
functions t 7→ ϕshock(t) for a constant rate model (Vasicek model with r0 = θ = 0.005 and σ = 0).
This study tends to show that shifted models such as Vasicek++ or CIR++ have much more
meaning after the shocks prescribed by the EIOPA than mean-reverting curve models such as Hull
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and White or Black and Karasinski models. In shifted models, the shock is translated in the
shifted functions ϕ that directly impacts rt. Instead, for mean-reverting models, the variations of
ϑ only impacts rt (and thus R(0, t)) after some time (typically 1/k), it is necessary to have strong
variations of ϑ to follow the variations of R(0, t) at each year t. This explains heuristically why
oscillations are observed to fit the shocked curve. Thus, in our numerical experiments, we work
then with the Vasicek++ model.
4 Numerical results
In this section, we provide numerical results for different model parameters. We compute the
solvency capital requirement of the insurance company for an ALM portfolio over T = 30 years
by using the standard formula. We study and discuss the impact of the shocks prescribed by the
standard formula, and the corresponding values of the SCR modules. In our simulations, we sample
exactly N paths (Sit , xit)t∈{1,...,T}, for 1 ≤ i ≤ N , and use the same simulations for the central and
shocked frameworks: this gives a fair comparison between different settings and models. In the first
subsection, we present general results with the shocks given by the present regulation in Europe [10]
and with interest rates around 2%. Then, we analyze in the second subsection the importance of the
cash flow matching in the ALM, and discuss its impact on the SCR. In the third subsection, we do
a similar analysis with low interest rates around 0.5% using the last table of shocks recommended
by the EIOPA (Table 7).
4.1 Analysis of the SCR with the standard formula
We work with the parameters describes in Tables 8 and 9: the interest rate model follows a Vasicek
model mean reverting around 2% while the minimum guaranteed rate is set at rG = 1.5%. Thus,
this is a setting somehow well balanced, in the sense that the all the cases A, B, C and D that
determine the crediting rate occur with a significant proportion. This is confirmed by the empirical
distribution plotted at the left of Figure 5. If rG were higher (resp. lower) we would observe mostly
cases C and D (resp. A and B).
To determine the constant allocation in stock and bond that we consider in our simulations, we
have drawn in the right of Figure 5 the different SCR components in function of ws, as well as the
global SCR given by formula (2.43). We use the shocks given by Table 6. In our simulations, we are
looking for an allocation that makes the SCR on equity and the SCR on interest rates of the same
order, since the aggregation formula (2.43) somehow encourages to diversify the risk components.
This is achieved by ws = 0.05. Note that in this case, this is also the allocation that minimizes
the SCR. As one may expect, the SCR on equity is increasing with respect to ws. The risk neutral
valuation dissuades from taking risk and is questionable in the life insurance context, as pointed
by Vedani et al. [22]. The monotonicity is also observed for the downward (resp. upward) shock
on the equity: the higher is ws, the less the insurance company has capital gains (resp. loss) from
the downward shocks. Here, the curves of SCRup and SCRdown cross also around ws = 0.05.
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Stock model Short-rate model
S0 = 1 r0 = θ = 0.02
σS = 0.1 σr = 0.01
γ = 0 k = 0.2
Table 8: Market-model parameters
Management Parameters Liability Parameters
Allocation in stock ws = 0.05 Lapse triggering threshold β = −0.01
Allocation in bond wb = 0.95 Massive lapse triggering threshold α = −0.05
Participation rate pipr = 0.9 Maximum lapse dynamic lapse rate DSRmax = 0.3
Minimum guaranteed rate rG = 0.015 Static lapse rate p = 0.05
Competitor rate rcompt = rt
Smoothing coefficient of the PSR: ρ¯ = 0.5
Bond portfolio maximal maturity n = 20
Table 9: Liability and management parameters
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Figure 5: Left: Empirical distribution of the cases A, B, C, and D determining the crediting rate,
in function of the time t. Right: the SCR modules in function of the constant allocation weight in
equity ws.
We now analyse the shocks. In Figure 6, we have plotted the empirical means of the crediting
rate and of the exit rate after the equity shock seq = −0.39. We have also indicated with a plus
sign (resp. a dotted line) the upper (resp. lower) bound of the 95% confidence interval. As one
may expect, the equity shock give an important loss resulting in a lower crediting rate and thus a
higher exit rate. Nonetheless, the effects on these rates are moderate due to the guaranteed rate:
in average, the maximal difference between the competitor rate rt is about 0.5%, and therefore
only few scenarios are at some time above the surrender triggering threshold β. The shocks on the
interest rate, illustrated in Figure 7 mix different effects. The downward shock gives an important
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gain at the beginning, but on the long run it makes harder for the insurance company to credit
the minimal guaranteed rate. This is known as the reinvestment risk in the literature. This fact is
confirmed by the plot of the mean value of the average coupon rate 1n
∑n
i=1 c
i
t, that is even slightly
below rG = 1.5% after 20 years. This plot of the average coupon rate also illustrates the rolling
mechanism described in equation (2.14). Conversely, the upward shock gives an important initial
loss, but on the long run it makes much easier for the insurance company to credit the minimal
guaranteed rate. Also, because of the initial loss, the insurer tends to credit at the beginning rather
low rates to policyholders while the competitor rate rt is high: this has an important effect on the
surrender rate.
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Figure 6: Before and after the equity shock of 39%. Evolution of the mean crediting rate E[rph(t)]
(left) and of the mean exit rate E[pet ] (right) in function of the time t.
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Figure 7: Before and after the downward and upward shocks on interest rates. Evolution of the
mean crediting rate E[rph(t)] (left), of the mean exit rate E[pet ] (middle) and of the average coupon
in the Bond portfolio (right)in function of the time t.
Let us mention here that we have also run the same ALM strategy when the competitor rate is
rcompt = max(rt, 0.9rph(t−1)). We have observed rather minor differences with the case rcompt = rt.
Therefore for the simplicity of the exposition, we have preferred to keep rcompt = rt in this numerical
section. Before going further with the analysis of the importance of the cash-flow matching, we
have drawn the dependence of the different SCR modules in function of γ that tunes the correlation
between the equity and the interest rate. This is the kind of quantitative study an ALM model
may help for. We observe that SCReq and SCRdown are decreasing and SCRup is increasing with
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Figure 8: Values of the different SCR modules in function of γ, the correlation between bonds and
stocks.
respect to γ. The aggregated SCR (2.43) is first slightly decreasing when SCRdown < SCRup and
then increasing. We notice an important discontinuity at SCRdown = SCRup which is due to the
ε coefficient in formula (2.43) that goes from 0 to 1/2 when SCRdown goes above SCRup. In the
range [−0.5, 0.5] usually observed for the correlation between stocks and sovereign bonds (see e.g.
Pericoli [20] or Rankin and Shah Idil [21]), we observe an important variation of 50% of SCRmkt,
half of which is contained by the discontinuity. Such a discontinuity in the SCR formula is unfair
and may incite insurer to be at the edge of this discontinuity: a continuous formula for SCRmkt
such as max(
√
SCR2eq + SCR2up,
√
SCR2eq + SCR2down + SCReqSCRdown) would avoid this.
4.2 Study of the cash-flow matching
In this paragraph, we want to assess the relevance of an original feature of our ALM model: the
cash-flow matching between the bond assets and the liabilities. This feature reproduces a common
practice of insurance companies. In order to have an idea of a good choice of n (the maximal
maturity of the bond combination (2.3)), we have plotted on the left of Figure 9 the Basic Own-
Funds defined in (2.36) in function of n for the central and shocked settings. Thus, the difference
between the curve of the central case and the shocked cases gives the values of SCRup and SCRdown.
We use here the same parameters as in Tables 8 and 9. We see that in the central case, the BOF
is maximized around n = 20, but is anyway rather flat between n = 15 and n = 30. As one may
expect, the BOF is increasing with respect to n in the downward shocked scenario: the more the
insurer invests in long maturity bonds, the more he benefits from the decrease of the interest rates.
For the upward shocks, two effects are mixed. On the one hand, the longer is the bond maturity,
the greater is the loss due to the shock. On the other hand, the insurer has interest to match well
the bond assets and the liabilities in order to keep as much as possible policyholders, since the high
interest rates will be profitable on the long run. Thus, the higher BOF are obtained for n = 7 and
n = 8. If the insurance company wants to have the minimal SCRint = max(SCRup, SCRdown) with
the standard formula, it has to choose n around where the curves crosses. Thus, n = 20 appears
to be the choice that minimizes SCRint. Note that due to the discontinuity of formula (2.43), this
is also a very good choice since we have also SCRup > SCRdown : with n = 21, we would have
SCRup < SCRdown and thus ε = 1/2, leading to a greater SCRmkt. Thus, we can tune the value of
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Figure 9: Left: mean value of the Basic Own-Funds in function of n (defining the bond com-
bination (2.3) in which bonds are invested) in the central framework and with the upward and
downward shocks on interest rates. Right: Macaulay durations of the assets (∂r0MV b0 ) and of the
liabilities (∂r0BEL0) in function of n.
n to satisfy SCRup > SCRdown and benefit from a better diversification coefficient of the standard
formula. In comparison, we have also considered the Macaulay duration of the assets and of the
liabilities after the initial allocation, i.e. ∂r0MV b0 and ∂r0BEL0. They are plotted in the right of
Figure 9, in function of n. The curves crosses around n = 10, which means that to be hedged
against small variations of the interest rate at time 0, the insurance company should take n = 10.
Note that from the graph on the left, this choice leads to a lower BOF in the central framework
and to a much higher SCR with the standard formula. This demonstrates if it were necessary that
hedging small variations is not the same as hedging shocks.
A proxy model. The discussion above already shows the importance of the choice of n. To go
further, we would like now to compare with a simpler model where there is no cash-flow matching.
This proxy model works as follows. At time 0, the insurer invests in a single at-par coupon bearing
bond with yield to maturity np and unitary market-value given by:
M¯V
b
0 = B(np, cnpswap(0)) = 1
At each time t ∈ {1, . . . , T}, the insurance company re-balances its according to target weights.
The available capital now is reinvested in a single bond with duration np. However, to approximate
the full model, we do not consider that the company sells all of its current bond of maturity np− 1
to buy new bonds with longer term np: this would imply a tremendous realization of capital gains
or losses, leading to important change in book values. To deal with this issue and make a fair
comparison with the original model, we propose the following approximation. Before reallocating
its portfolio, the insurer adjusts its holding in bonds and compute φbt2 such that:
φbt−1B(np − 1, cbt−1) = φbt2B(np, c˜nt )
where:
c˜nt =
1
n
cnswap(t) + (1−
1
n
)cbt−1
we assume that this procedure does not lead to a realization of CGL. The purpose of this approx-
imation is to adjust the holding in bonds in order to remain unchanged the current market-value
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φbt−1B(np − 1, cbt−1) of the bond portfolio while taking into account the reinvestment risk of the
original model. In particular, the original model reinvests the nominal value at the swap rate,
which justifies the term 1ncnswap(t), and keeps a fraction 1− 1n of bonds with unchanged coupons.
To determine the maturity np of the bond used in the proxy model, we choose the maturity np
in order to keep approximately the same gain or loss between both models after the downward or
upward shock:
∆MV0 ≈ ∆MV proxy0 (np) (4.1)
After numerical investigation, the choice np = n2 is satisfactory in practice. Then, to obtain exactly
the same size of shocks in terms of loss or gain, we adjust then the position in bonds in the proxy
model:
φb,proxy0+ MV
b,proxy
0+ = φb0+MV b0+. (4.2)
This adjustment is important to compare fairly the two models: thus, the shocks induces the same
initial loss or gain. Figure 10 illustrates the difference between the original and the proxy models on
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Figure 10: Empirical BOF distributions with the proxy model and the original (Basket) model with
a basket of bonds, after the downward shock (left), the upward shock (right) and in the central
framework (middle).
the Basic Own-Funds distribution in the central setting and after the interest rate shocks. Table 10
indicates the corresponding BOF mean values, and Table 11 the associated SCR values. We observe
two effects. In all cases, we observe that the BOF distribution has less variance and is more peaked
in the original model. This is expected: the basket of bonds allows a good cash-flow matching
between the nominal value of the expiring bonds and the surrendering policyholders. The second
effect concerns the interest rate shocks. In both cases, the original model performs much better
than the proxy model. This is again due to the cash-flow matching. These shocks induce large
latent gains or losses on bonds: with the proxy model, the insurer is forced to realize a part of it
since he pays policyholders by selling a fraction of its portfolio. For the central setting and the
shock on equity, there is no longer important latent gains or losses on bonds, and the mean BOF
values are roughly the same between both models. Note that this is clear for the upward shock
since realizing losses reduce the yearly P&L, but the interpretation for the downward shock is less
obvious. Besides, on this second effect, we notice that the upward shock is even more expensive
than the downward shock for the proxy model: from Table 10, the difference with the original
basket model is equal to 0.0036 for the downward shock, versus 0.0092 for the upward shock. This
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difference is due to the massive rate of surrenders in the upward shock (see Figure 7), which is
caused by the increase of the competitor rate rt. Thus, these increased surrenders have again to be
paid by selling a greater fraction of portfolio, leading to realize even more losses. This effect has
already been noticed in the literature, see [18].
Basket Proxy
Central 0.0208 [0.0206,0.02010] 0.0207 [0.0203,0.0210]
Equity shock 0.0136 [0.0134, 0.0139] 0.0134 [0.0130, 0.0137]
Downward shock 0.0130 [0.0128, 0.0133] 0.0094 [ 0.0091, 0.0096]
Upward shock 0.0145 [0.0142, 0.0147] 0.0053 [0.0049, 0.0056]
Table 10: Mean value of the BOF in the original and the proxy models with 95% confidence interval,
under the central and shocked settings.
Let us now comment quickly the different SCR values in Table 11. An obvious remark is that
the standard formula that relies on mean values is not sensitive to the BOF distributions and does
not reward if they are more peaked with less variance. This is a clear weakness of the standard
formula. Thus, the first effect described just above has no impact on the SCR, and for example
the values of SCReq is the same on both models. The second effect has instead some impact on
the interest rate modules of the SCR, leading to some improvement of SCRmkt. Note that the
improvement is nonetheless tamed by the fact that in the aggregated formula (2.43), we use ε = 0
for the proxy model and ε = 1/2 for the original model with a basket of bonds.
Basket Proxy
SCReq 0.0072 0.0073
SCRdown 0.0078 0.0113
SCRup 0.0063 0.0154
SCRmkt 0.0119 0.0170
Table 11: Different values of the SCR modules.
4.3 Analysis in a low interest rate framework
In this paragraph, we investigate our model in a framework where interest rates are low (around
0.5%) to be closer to the current interest rates. This was the rate observed for the 10Y bonds issued
by France (OAT) at the beginning of 2019. As explained in Paragraph 2.5.2, the multiplicative
shocks are no longer relevant in this context and we have applied the last recommendation of the
EIOPA given in Table 7. The model parameters are specified in Tables 12 and 13. Note that we
have considered here a higher structural surrender rate of 10%, and therefore a smaller value of n,
the maximal maturity of the basket of bonds. Again, we have taken a constant allocation in equity
ws that is such that the SCReq and SCRint are approximately of the same order.
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Stock model Short-rate model
S0 = 1 r0 = θ = 0.005
σS = 0.1 σr = 0.01
γ = 0 k = 0.2
Table 12: Market-model parameters in the low yield framework.
Management Parameters Liability Parameters
Allocation in stock ws = 0.08 Lapse triggering threshold β = −0.01
Allocation in bond wb = 0.92 Massive lapse triggering threshold α = −0.05
Participation rate pipr = 0.9 Maximum lapse dynamic lapse rate DSRmax = 0.3
Minimum guaranteed rate rG = 0 Static lapse rate p = 0.1
Competitor rate rcompt = rt
Smoothing coefficient of the PSR: ρ¯ = 0.5
Bond portfolio maximal maturity n = 10
Table 13: Liability and management parameters in the low yield framework.
We have plotted in Figure 11 the crediting rate, the surrending proportion and the average
coupon rate. The behavior is roughly the same as the one observed in Figure 7 for higher interest
rates, and we do not repeat the interpretation. We also observe than on the downward shock, we
get negative average coupon values. The small differences between both cases can be explained by
the change of method for the shocks. First, we notice on our examples that the additive term in
the shocks makes the shocks stronger at the beginning. For example, the spread on the mean exit
rate between the upward shock and the central framework is about 0.09 at year 2 instead of 0.05 in
Figure 7 for a 2% interest rate. Of course, the multiplicative shock would have been stronger for a
higher interest rate, but a simple calculation made on constant interest rates indicate that the 1Y
shock obtained with zero interest rates and Table 7 (2.14%) is almost the same as the one obtained
with 3% interest rates and Table 6 (2.1%). Another difference is that the crediting rates change
of monotonicity after 10-15 years in the shocked framework. This is mostly due to the fact that
the shift functions (left of Figure 4) have opposite monotonicity after year 20, while they remain
essentially parallel (left of Figure 1) with the shocks of Table 6. Since n = 10, this has an effect on
the coupon rates from year 10 and on the competitor rate from year 20. Another interesting plot is
the calculation of the BOF in function of n, the maximum maturity of the basket of bonds, which
is displayed in Figure 12. The behavior is very similar to the one observed on the left of Figure 9.
Nonetheless, we see here that the SCRup and SCRdown crosses around n = 12, making this choice
optimal for the minimization of the SCRint and even SCRmkt since we have SCRup > SCRdown
for this choice. Thus, contrary to the previous case, the best choice of n to minimize SCRint is
not 1/p. More suprisingly, it does not also satisfy n ≤ 1/p, as one should take to have the nominal
values of expiring bonds greater than the value of the surrending contracts. This shows anyway
that our model can be a useful tool to determine the investment in different bond maturities.
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Figure 11: Before and after the downward and upward shocks on interest rates. Evolution of the
mean crediting rate E[rph(t)] (left), of the mean exit rate E[pet ] (middle) and of the average coupon
in the Bond portfolio (right) in function of the time t.
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Figure 12: Mean value of the Basic Own-Funds in function of n (defining the bond combination (2.3)
in which bonds are invested) in the central framework and with the upward and downward shocks
on interest rates.
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